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BOOK REVIEWS 
PETER A. DONOV AN* 
UNITED STATES, COMMON MARKET AND INTERNA-
TIONAL ANTITRUST: A COMPARATIVE GUIDE. By BARRY 
E. HAWK. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 1979, 946 pp., 
$75.00, cloth. 
The antitrust laws have been part of United States law for over ninety years 
and have received the constant and skillful attention of law review commen-
tators, but they have been, until recently, largely ignored by "hornbook" 
authors. Now, however, what Williston and Corbin have done for contracts, 
others are seeking to do for antitrust. The past five years have seen the 
publication of several commendable treatises on antitrust. 1 Most of these 
works present a general or survey analysis on antitrust. One however, United 
States, Common Market and International Antitrust: A Comparative Guide, concen-
trates attention on the pecularities of international antitrust. This book by 
Barry E. Hawk deserves high praise. It is a treatise that will be valued by 
academicians, government officials, and antitrust practitioners. 
Professor Hawk's book is obviously a labor of love; it began with materials 
compiled for his law school seminar, which explains the book's heavy em-
phasis on primary source material. 2 While the reliance on primary sources is a 
strong feature of the book, Hawk does more than simply provide us with a 
convenient single source compilation. His book offers a provocative analysis of 
the extraterritorial reach of the United States antitrust laws, a perceptive 
analysis of the European Common Market competition laws, and a review of 
the emerging international codes and guidelines. Each chapter is buttressed by 
an outstanding bibliography immensely valuable to scholar and practitioner. 
Hawk may not have intended an exhaustive treatise on the subject, but he has 
provided us with an excellent "hornbook" examination of existing law and 
• Peter A. Donovan is a Professor of Law at Boston College Law School; A.B., 1957; LL.B., 
1960, Boston College; LL.M., Georgetown; LL.M., 1975, Harvard. 
1. E.g.,J. ATWOODANDV. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD (1981); 
P. ARCEDAANDD. TUNER, ANTITRUST LAWS (1978, 1980); E. KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST 
LAWS (1980); L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST (1976); see also A.B.A., ANTI-
TRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS (1975)_ 
2. B. HAWK, UNITED STATES, COMMON MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST: A COM-
PARATIVE GUIDE, at vi-vii [hereinafter cited as HAWK]. 
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possible future developments. The book exceeds Hawk's modest goal of "pro-
vid[ing] the reader with a working familiarity of the relevant issues."3 
Prefessor Hawk has divided his book into three parts. Part One examines 
the applicability of the United States antitrust and related trade laws to inter-
national transactions. The European Common Market competition policy is 
the subject of Part Two. Here, Hawk compares and contrasts European and 
American policies. Part Three, which contains only twenty-seven pages, 
focuses on international regulation of restrictive business practices and 
technology transfers. 
Professor Hawk's examination of the serious problems engendered by the 
extraterritorial application of the United States antitrust laws to transnational 
transactions is fundamentally sound and most welcomed. More than twenty 
years have passed since Kingman Brewster raised these issues in his 
authoritative text,· and Hawk addresses them immediately in his book. His 
analysis of the old precedents establishing the" effects" test for subject matter 
jurisdiction in foreign commerce is clear and provides an excellent back-
ground for the analysis of the "balance of interests" approach now emerging 
from recent decisions. 5 Hawk seems to favor the newer test although he ques-
tions certain aspects6 which are "particularly troublesome."7 
The discussion of the judiciary's use of comity, foreign sovereign compul-
sion, act-of-state and sovereign immunity as doctrinal limitations on the exer-
cise of subject matter jurisdiction is helpful. Professor Hawk uncovers some 
problems. He criticizes the territorial limitation on the act-of-state doctrine 
and foreign sovereign compulsion defense as mechanical8 and prone to un-
fairness. 9 Instead, he would weigh the extraterritorial aspect of the foreign 
government's action as but one factor in a "balancing of interests" approach. 
The treatment of other related doctrines is equally rewarding. According to 
Professor Hawk, the relevance of Parker v. Brown10 and its progeny to foreign 
commerce "is not at all clear." 11 Whether the constitutional bases for the 
Noerr-Penningtonl2 doctrine can apply to the procurement of foreign govern-
3. !d. at vii. 
4. K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD, 11-12 (1958), quoted in 
HAWK, supra note 2, at 2-3. Brewster's work has recently been updated: See note 1 supra. 
5. See, t.g., Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979), and 
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Book of America, N.T.&.S.A., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1977). 
6. HAWK, supra note 2, at 42-43. 
7. !d. at 43. 
8. !d. at 132. 
9. !d. at 155. 
10. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). Parker v. Brown applied the so-called "state action" exemption - the 
sovereign compulsion defense. 
11. HAWK, supra note 2, at 170. 
12. The doctrine is embodied in three decisions: Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr 
Motor Freight Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961), United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 
(1965) and California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972). 
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ment actions is "highly questionable," 13 but other factors "support serious 
consideration of an extension." 14 
The publication of the book follows the promulgation by the United States 
Department of Justice of its Antitrust Guide for International Operations. 15 
Professor Hawk refers to the Guide throughout Part One of the book which 
enhances his analysis of individual issues. He even suggests that "the thrust of 
the International Antitrust Guide is quite consistent with the decision[ s 1" for-
mulating the new balance of interests test for subject matter jurisdiction. 16 
Professor Hawk finds the International Antitrust Guide desirable because 
its general statement of enforcement policy may eliminate some of the confu-
sion and uncertainty which has inhibited business operation. 17 Although he 
feels "the Guide's period of operation has been too brief to support firm con-
clusions, it is already evident that, at the least, it has initiated a useful dialogue 
on many of the issues raised in the international antitrust area. "18 While 
Hawk expresses agreement, albeit not always complete agreement, with some 
of the Guide's positions,19 he finds other positions taken in the GUlde to be 
"unpersuasive, "20 "potentially troublesome, "21 "disingenuous, "22 "unfor-
tunate, "23 and even "not unambiguous. "24 In one instance, Hawk 
13. HAWK, supra note 2, at 146. 
14. [d. at 147. 
15. [1977] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA), (Feb. 1,1977), E-l [hereinafter cited as 
INT'L ANTITRUST GUIDE]. 
16. HAWK, supra note 2, at 44. 
17.ld.at5. 
18. !d. 
19. For example, with respect to the Guide's hypothetical cases C, D, E and M, which involve 
joint ventures, Hawk states that "while the Discussions in these four cases may not clarify the 
legal ambiguities to everyone's satisfaction, they are welcome as relieving unnecessary fears on 
the part of business that many international joint ventures will be challenged by the Justice 
Department." [d. at 273. Although Case D is thus "welcome" Hawk also suggests it is "incon-
sistent" with some precedent and complains that it provides "little or no practical guidance on 
the cruical issue of determining at what point territorial restrictions are unlawful as part of a 
broader cartel scheme." [d. at 215-16. 
Case I of the Guide which deals with exclusive grant-back licensing, provides another example 
of Hawk's limited acceptance. He generally finds the Discussion of Case I as "a welcome state-
ment of the Justice Department position," but he quarrels with its application in one instance. 
[d. at 221. 
20. Case J relating to foreign distribution agreements and export restraints. !d. at 189. 
21. CaseJ.!d. at 193. 
22. Case H covering the licensing of know-how by a United States company to a nonmarket 
(state-owned) enterprise. [d. at 232. 
23. Case B which concerns an American company's foreign acquisitions. [d. at 259. 
24. !d. at 87. Hawk here refers to the question whether the per se rules developed in domestic 
commerce cases should be applied with equal vigor in foreign commerce. His complaint that 
"[t]he International Antitrust Guide is also not unambiguous" is directed toward the GUIDE'S 
position that: 
The rule of reason may have a somewhat broader application to international transac-
tions where it is found that (1) experience with adverse effects on competition is much 
more limited than in the domestic market, or (2) there are some special justifications not 
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"welcomes" the Guide's position despite "[d]oubts about the operability (if 
not1:he appropriateness) ofthe Guide's test."25 Here, the author addresses the 
"intra-enterprise conspiracy" doctrine. He applauds the Guide's statement 
that "a parent corporation may allocate territories or set prices for the sub-
sidiaries"26 over which it "maintains effective working control"27 whether 
that control springs from a majority or minority stock position. 28 Hawk would 
substitute a broader and more flexible approach for the control standard, but 
his chief complaint is directed toward the Guide's further statement that the 
Sherman Act will still "reach coercive attempts by members of a corporate 
group to drive third parties out of business or out of markets. "29 This limita-
tion is found particularly troublesome because it is devoid of criteria for 
separating lawful expansion of market share from unlawful conspiracy. Hawk 
correctly queries: "Is it logical to assert that even though the parent controls 
the subsidiary the two can still conspire if their intent is to lower prices in order 
to drive out competitors but not if their intent is to raise prices?"30 This query 
is well-taken but Hawk's further criticism "[h]ow, and to what extent if at all, 
does a pre-existing stock affiliation between potential competitors affect the 
analysis,' '31 seems to miss the point. One wonders if Hawk is still referring to 
parent-subsidiary arrangements here. The Guide's statement is directed at af-
filiated companies and seems clearly intended to say that the Sherman Act will 
continue to apply to coercive parent-subsidiary combinations to drive com-
petitors out of business. Hence, the pre-existing stock affiliation is immaterial. 
Nevertheless, Hawk's examination of the intra-enterprise issue also leads 
him to complain that "another defect in the Guide is its failure to sufficiently 
identify the criteria for distinguishing between 1) a general cartel scheme and 
2) a unilateral decision to establish foreign subsidiaries. "32 Hawk has un-
covered here a significant flaw, but his elaboration on the issue unfortunately 
detracts from his point. The immediately following sentence states: "[I]t is 
highly questionable whether the existence of pre-existing stock affiliation, used 
in the Guide to distinguish Timken. 33 sholllrll'llways be the detcrminating fac-
to basic horizontal restraints designed to affect U. S. market prices or conditions or to 
divide the U.S. market from other markets. (Footnote omitted.) 
INT'L ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 15, at E·1. 
25. Case A dealing with the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine. /d. at 91-93. 
26. INT'L ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 15, at E-4. 
27. /d. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. 
30. HAWK, supra note 2, at 93. 
31. /d. 
32. Id. 
33. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951). 
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tor. " 34 Yet, nowhere does the Guide state that unilateral decisions to establish 
foreign subsidiaries are always distinguishable from general cartel schemes by 
the existence of prior stock affiliation. Moreover, Timken was distinguished 
because the anticompetitive restraints there involved long preceded the stock 
affiliation. 35 It is unlikely that Hawk intends to suggest that territorial and 
price agreements between nonaffiliated companies should be treated the same 
as those between parent and subsidiary. Hawk's point is not entirely clear. 
The book has other weaknesses beyond its occasional confusion in analysis 
of the International Antitrust Guide. Hawk sometimes makes statements 
assumed to be self-evident, but which are not. For example, Hawk argues that 
"[ w Jhile the general rules applicable in the purely domestic situation apply to 
a foreign manufacturer distributing within the United States, the manufac-
turer's status as a foreign competitor could be a factor in some situations" 
because "territorial or customer restrictions may be more justifiable or 
'reasonable' if necessary or helpful to overcome barriers to entry into the 
United States market. "36 How? One can quickly see that territorial restric-
tions might affect a foreign firm's willingness to enter but this does not relate 
to what is generally meant by the phrase a "barrier to entry." A factor whose 
presence constitutes a condition for entry for one firm may not be a prerequi-
site for any others and hence its absence would not constitute a barrier to entry 
in the real sense. The relationship between territorial and customer restric-
tions and entry barriers which Hawk assumes to be self-evident is not at all 
clear. It is also not clear that the desire to limit dealers' territories or customers 
is greater for a foreign entrant than for a market-expanding domestic entrant. 
The book has other shortcomings as well. Hawk's analysis of vertical ar-
rangements involving the distribution of imports into the United States is 
weak because it is too cavalierly treated in a page-and-a-quarter. This is also 
true of his treatment of the vicarious liability of an American parent for the an-
ticompetitive conduct of its foreign subsidiaries. This issue deserves more than 
the two-and-a-half pages accorded it. 
While it is possible to find criticisms of the book if one looks for them, it is 
still clear that Hawk has authored a very fine treatise. He deserves commenda-
tion and his book deserves attention. 
34. HAWK, supra note 2, at 93. 
35. The Guide states, "The preexisting territorial agreement between Timken anrl Vickers in-
terests ... could not be saved by a subsequent stock affiliation." 
36. HAWK, supra note 2, at 187-88. 
